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S t a t e of Utah, 
Defendant -Appel lan t . 
Case No. 21010 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of driver license 
revocation issued by the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah, t he Honorable Dean Conder 
p r e s i d i n g . 
The Thi rd D i s t r i c t Court he ld a t r i a l de novo on 
October 2 3 , 1985 t o determine whether a p p e l l a n t ' s d r i v e r ' s 
l i c e n s e should be revoked under U t a h ' s Implied Consent S t a t u t e . 
In accordance wi th Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953 as amended), 
t h e t r i a l cou r t found t h a t : 
1) The o f f i c e r had cause t o and did a r r e s t t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r for d r i v i n g while under the i n f l u e n c e . 
2) The p e t i t i o n e r was p rope r ly reques ted t o t ake a 
chemical t e s t , pursuan t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953 as 
amended), and warned of t h e consequences t o t h e d r i v i n g permit i f 
t h e r e was a r e f u s a l . 
3) The petitioner, having refused to submit to a 
chemical testf should be denied her petition and license should 
be revoked for one year which would expire on August 29, 1986. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On July 27, 1985, about 2:15 a.m. (R. 20), Office Scott 
Gardner observed appellant Luann Lee turn west on to 600 South, 
an east-bound one way street. Lee apparently did not realize 
that she was going the wrong way on a one way street, despite 
having to go around another vehicle coming towards her in the 
same lane. (R. 21) Officer Gardner switched on his overhead 
lights and followed appellant as she continued to drive for a few 
more blocks and then turn into the Radisson Hotel parking lot. 
She nearly hit several other parked vehicles while attempting to 
stop. 
Officer Gardner approached the appellant and asked her 
if she had been drinking. She said she had "had a couple." (R. 
23) Lee had a strong odor of alcohol about her, her eyes were 
bloodshot, and her speech was slurred. (R. 23) She was also 
unsteady on her feet. 
The officer asked Lee to take the field sobriety tests. 
A female passenger in the car kept interjecting and trying to 
give appellant advice not to take the field tests. (R.28) 
Officer Gardner then placed appellant under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and going the wrong way on 
a one way street. At this time, the appellant began crying. The 
appellant continued to cry during the short trip to the police 
station. In the police station parking lot, Officer Gardner 
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requested Lee to take a chemical breathalyzer t e s t . After the 
• 08 admonition she said f "You're going to ruin my job . " (R. 26) 
The off icer gave her the second admonition with no response. The 
officer*then gave her the t h i rd warning spec i f i ca l ly s t a t i ng tha t 
i f she did not submit to the t e s t , he would deem her behavior a 
r e fusa l . (R. 20) Lee then said r "Please help me" and continued 
to cry . (R. 27) Officer Gardner waited in s i lence for a 
subs tan t ia l period of time, a t l e a s t ten minutes, for the 
appellant t o request the t e s t . He then asked her in h i s own 
words, to take the t e s t and he explained the consequences and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of losing her l i c ense . (R. 27) S t i l l f Lee did not 
request the t e s t . At no point did she indicate that she was 
confused concerning the warnings or a Miranda warning or unable 
to hear or understand the request and warnings. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Appellant was given a clear explanation of her r igh t s 
and dut ies under the Implied Consent S t a tu t e . Appel lant ' s 
response to the o f f i c e r ' s request to take a chemical t e s t 
object ively indicated a re fusa l . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PACTS SHOW THE OFFICER CLEARLY INFORMED 
THE APPELLANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING 
A BREATHALYZER TEST. 
The Implied Consent Sta tu te § 41-6-44.10(2) (1953 as 
amended) s t a t e s tha t if a person ar res ted for driving under the 
influence refuses to take a chemical t e s t as requested by the 
peace off icer f that peace off icer must warn the person tha t a 
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refusal can result in revocation for one year of his or her 
license to operate a motor vehicle. The statute provides that 
after the warning, the person must immediately request the 
chemical test or else no test will be given and the person will 
be considered to have refused to take the test. This court has 
stated that "the important and mandatory aspects of this section 
are: after his arrest, the person should be informed which 
chemical test the officer has designated, and the consequences of 
his refusal to submit to the requested test." Elliot v. Dorius, 
557 P.2d 759, 761, 762 (Utah 1976). This court has further held 
that if a person manifests confusion caused by the officer's 
reading of Miranda, then the officer must give a clear 
explanation of the driverfs rights under Miranda and his duties 
under the implied consent law. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 
1334 (Utah 1979) . 
The appellant did not manifest confusion concerning her 
affirmative duty to take the test nor did the officer cause any 
confusion with a Miranda warning. To the contrary, appellant 
made two statements to the officer which show her awareness of 
the situation. She said, "You1re going to ruin my job" (R. 8) 
and, "Please help me." Obviously, these objective statements 
show that appellant realized that she had been caught driving 
while intoxicated. She also apparently realized that there would 
be consequences as explained by Officer Gardner and that her 
refusal could have direct repercussions on her license and her 
work. 
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If an arresting officer gives the arrestee "fair 
warningf noticesf and an opportunity to be heard as to the 
consequence of his refusal, " then the arrested person1s due 
process rights are preserved and the officer has satisfactorily 
warned the arrestee. Larsen v. Schwendiman, No. 20185 (Utah 
filed Dec. 12, 1985) (emphasis added). In this case, Officer 
Gardner requested appellant to take a breath test while they were 
both in the front seat of the police car parked next to the 
police station. The officer gave her all three admonitions and 
each time he repeated his request. Because appellant continued 
to cry, the officer even went beyond the required explanations. 
He waited in silence for at least ten minutes to afford appellant 
a chance to compose herself and request the test. She did 
neither. The officer then explained again, in his own words, the 
possible consequences of her refusal and asked her to take the 
test. 
As this court asked in Beck v. Cox, 497 P.2d 1335, 
1337, "how many times should an officer ask a driver, who refused 
to give an unequivocal answer, to take the test? The answer is 
in Cavenass v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979) which provides as 
the statute does for an immediate and "simple 'yes' or 'no1 to 
the officer's request, the obvious legislative purpose being to 
eliminate delays." Drivers should not be allowed to equivocate. 
A driver must agree to take a test immediately following a 
warning of the consequences of a refusal. If a driver does not 
do so, a refusal is conclusively presumed. Conrad v. 
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984). Officer Gardner 
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warned appel lant th ree t imes, waited a subs tan t ia l amount of 
time, and then warned her again. The appel lant was upset and 
perhaps i n a t t e n t i v e , yet the off icer did a l l he was required to 
do and beyond in an effor t to give her clear not ice and an 
opportunity to hear the consequences of her ac t ions . Short of 
ye l l i ng a t appel lant or bullying her in to responding, Officer 
Gardner could do nothing more. 
Appellant does not have the r igh t to reasonably refuse 
to submit to a chemical t e s t . Caveness a t 352. Under the 
implied consent s t a t u t e , appel lant i s deemed to have already 
given her consent to a chemical t e s t whenever she operates a 
motor veh ic le . U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 and Moran v. Cox. 580 P.2d 241, 
243 (Utah, 1978). A person threatened with the lo s s of her 
d r i v e r ' s l i cense has only the r igh t to make a choice and must 
make a choice based on a fa i r explanation of her r igh t s and 
du t i e s . Holman, at 1334. The fact t h a t appel lant did not heed 
the o f f i c e r ' s warnings and thus made an unwise choice does not 
excuse her from her duty to take the t e s t nor does i t r e l i eve her 
of the explained consequences. 
Officer Gardner did everything reasonable under the 
circumstances to afford appel lant the information needed to make 
a proper decision without delay. Appel lant ' s t e a r s do not render 
the o f f i c e r ' s explanation l e s s clear or l e s s reasonable. 
Appel lant ' s uncooperativeness should not be rewarded since the 
off icer gave appel lant a clear explanation of the consequences of 
a re fusa l . See Hack at 13 37. 
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POINT I I 
APPELLANT'S BEHAVIOR CONSTITUTED A REFUSAL TO 
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST, 
Of f ice r s must o f ten deal with uncoopera t ive and h o s t i l e 
d r i v e r s . If t he implied consent s t a t u t e were i n t e r p r e t e d t o 
r e q u i r e an expres s f v o l i t i o n a l and p e r f e c t l y understood ve rba l 
r e f u s a l / the dangerous d r i v e r could avoid the s t a t u t o r y 
consequences by equ ivoca t ing or remaining s i l e n t and then " l a t e r 
c la iming an unexpressed i n t e n t t o t ake the t e s t . " Beck v. Cox, 
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979) . An a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r cannot know the 
s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e of mind of an a r r e s t e e . There fo re , t he r e f u s a l 
i s not r equ i r ed t o be in unequivocal t e rms ; a d r i v e r ' s behavior 
i n d i c a t i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n t o re fuse i s s u f f i c i e n t . Conrad v. 
Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736 (Utah 1984) . The s t andard for 
de termining whether a d r i v e r i n t e n d s h i s response t o equal a 
r e f u s a l must be o b j e c t i v e . 
This cour t has p r e v i o u s l y addressed types of responses 
which c o n s t i t u t e r e f u s a l s . In Mathie v . Schwendiman, 656 P.2d 
463 (Utah 1982) , a d r i v e r ' s r e fu sa l to remove chewing gum from 
h i s mouth in order t o produce a v a l i d b rea th t e s t was cons idered 
a r e fu sa l t o take t h e t e s t . In Beck v . Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 
1979) , the p l a i n t i f f would not say "yes" or "no" but only "I 
d o n ' t know." The t o t a l i t y of h i s conduct was a r e fusa l t o do 
what was neces sa ry . In Conrad v» Schwendimanr 680 p.2d 736 (Utah 
1984) , t he d r i v e r f i r s t responded t o a reques t for a b rea th t e s t 
by ag ree ing only t o take a blood t e s t . His response t o 
subsequent r e q u e s t s was t o express concern for h i s c a r . He never 
e x p r e s s l y refused or agreed t o t ake the t e s t . The Court s a id t he 
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diver must "immediately" agree following a warning of the 
consequences of a refusal, "otherwise, refusal is conclusively 
presumed." Xd. p. 738. In each case, this court has held that 
"the volitional failure to do what is necessary in order that the 
test can be performed is a refusal." Beck, at 1338. Mathie, at 
464. See £onrad at 738. 
Appellant in this case responded to the officer's 
request by crying. The subjective intent behind this continuous 
sobbing cannot be determined: it may have been a result of fear, 
the liquor consumed, or an effort to manipulate the officer. 
However, her behavior effectively rendered it impossible to 
perform the test, whatever her unexpressed intent may have been. 
The record of the trial de novo shows that at no time, 
either during the arrest or the trial, did appellant claim to be 
confused or to have intended to take the test. Counsel for the 
appellant argues only that her response did not clearly indicate 
an intention to refuse. 
Again, in Caveness, this court held that the Implied 
Consent Statute precluded the defense of "reasonable refusal." A 
driver is required to give only a simple "yes" or "no" to an 
officer's request. Caveness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). 
The legislative purpose is "to eliminate delays" in the taking of 
tests because alcohol quickly dissipates with time. Xd. at 352 
(emphasis added). Here, appellant refused to provide a "yes" or 
"no" and the continuous crying acted as a delay. 
As discussed previously, Officer Gardner did 
everything he could to elicit some response from appellant. He 
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continued to ask appellant to take the testf although he is not 
required to do so when a driver refuses to answer simply to a 
clearly stated request. Conrad, at 73 8. Appellant's behavior 
was difficult and uncooperative. Judged objectively, even by a 
disinterested bystanderf a p p e l l a n t ' s behavior c o n s t i t u t e d a 
r e f u s a l . 
CONCLUSION 
The o f f i c e r c l e a r l y exp la ined t h e consequences of a 
r e f u s a l t o the a p p e l l a n t . A p p e l l a n t ' s behav io ra l response was 
uncoopera t ive and would have delayed t h e t e s t con t r a ry t o t he 
s t a t u t e . Whatever her unexpressed and s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t 
concerning t h e chemical t e s t may have been f t h e o f f i c e r and t h e 
t r i a l cour t only cons idered a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s from an o b j e c t i v e 
s t a n d a r d . A p p e l l a n t ' s cont inuous behavior and ve rba l c o n d i t i o n a l 
response rendered any chemical t e s t imposs ib le t o immediately 
a d m i n i s t e r . Therefore , a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s and words c o n s t i t u t e d 
a r e f u s a l . 
The Respondent r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h e cou r t t o 
uphold the d i s c r e t i o n and t h e f i n d i n g s of the t r i a l cour t and to 
l e t i t s order s t and . 
DATED t h i s day of February , 1986. 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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